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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
TO: Mr. Dulles		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS: F.Y.I.		
FROM: Stanley J. Grogan, Asst. to the DCI		
ROOM NO. 1-F-08	BUILDING Hqrs.	EXTENSION x 7676

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16 January 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

1. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] had an interview in Mr. Bissell's office this morning regarding the unsuccessful Cuban invasion attempt of last April. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Mr. Bissell saw them after he had discussed whether or not he should see them with the Director and with me. Mr. McCone and I were of the belief that there was nothing to lose by seeing them, and there might be some gain for the Agency. [REDACTED] (b)(2)

2. I thought Mr. Bissell did an excellent job. He accused no other element of Government as being responsible for the failure. His presentation was philosophical in part. The essence of his talk was that now looking at it with the benefit of hind-sight, the initial plans were sound. Mr. Bissell explained that to get the big picture one must realize the necessity that existed to judge political problems against power problems; to determine if the United States by the use of military power would have such gains that the military effort would take precedence over political considerations; i.e., our standing as a nation in the United Nations and in the various other areas of the world; could the United States be openly connected with the military operation or would political considerations require that the operation be covert and presumably conducted by Cubans?

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3. Mr. Bissell recalled plans for the invasion that were considered, as he remembered, in March of 1960. He thought, he said, in answer to a question, that the camps outside the United States came into being some time in the autumn of 1960. In answer to another question about allegations that Batista followers, in some numbers, were part of the invasion effort, Mr. Bissell decidedly did not agree. He said that from the very first there was an understanding that Batista followers would not be used. [REDACTED] raised the point that apparently a matter of definition was involved here; Mr. Bissell agreed. He explained that military officers who were pro-Batista and participated in security and intelligence activities certainly were weeded out and were not acceptable, although you would find, even in some of the former Batista army officers, some professionals who could not be ear-marked as Batista adherents. The enlisted men, however, who were not followers of Batista, were very carefully checked and would not be considered Batista-ites if they passed the qualification rules. (b)(3)

4. [REDACTED] brought up the name of a man captured on the beach and later put to death who was a Batista follower, he said. Mr. Bissell explained that investigation showed that the man was not a member of the invading brigade. He had signed on as a member of a ship's crew, on a commercial vessel, and when the troops went ashore, he went with them and was captured.

5. There were a series of questions and the gist of Mr. Bissell's replies as I understood them were about as follows: The first training given to Cubans was in signal communications, with the thought that the Cubans would learn how to use radio sets to call for supply drops to guerilla forces in the Escambrays and in Oriente. At that time the plan under consideration was to infiltrate a

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number of small groups and supply them with material to accomplish their mission and later to have the D-Day invasion followed shortly thereafter with a second, small invasion in the area between Guantanamo and Baracoa and another invasion at Pinar Del Rio. It became evident, however, he said, that a clandestine underground had not been well established and it would be difficult, if not impossible, to establish an effective one. Castro did a very clever thing in using his partly trained militia to seal off areas where the resistance forces were located, and the resistance people, in order to try to get food, had to attempt a break-through, but in most cases they were captured and put to death. They had no communications that would permit air drops. One of the objectives of the landing was to establish a beachhead, make it secure, have air cover to protect it, and to have air supremacy by first having knocked out Castro's air. Mr. Bissell said that later there were restrictions laid down which had a vital bearing on the operations. There was to be no air support; there were to be no pilots other than Cubans; there was to be no American real estate used.

6. Mr. Bissell said Castro used his air very well in attacking the ships rather than attacking the ground forces. He denied that there ever was any activity out of Guantanamo. He philosophized that the contemplated operation had become so well known because of leaks to the Press by Cuban leaders that it no longer was a covert operation. He said when such an operation is no longer covert, then it should be handled by the Pentagon and this, of course, raises the basic question: Would it have been wise for the United States to have gone all out with military power, having the military override the political considerations?

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7. Regarding Cuban complaints that some of their leaders were practically prisoners and couldn't visit the training camps, Mr. Bissell explained that by keeping them away from the training camps it was believed a situation had been averted that could have led to trouble because in the camps you had men who were living rather difficult lives while the soft-living politicians would come in to visit them and hostile feelings might result, whereas the military command required unity and harmony.

8. There was some criticism of Mr. Bender and the allegation was repeated that maybe Washington didn't know what CIA agents in Miami were doing. Mr. Bissell defended Mr. Bender and said that he felt sure that Washington was well informed at all times. He also had some good words to say for Cardona and Varona.

9. [REDACTED] were very much pleased with the coldly, dispassionate, (b)13 objective, philosophical statements by Mr. Bissell who did not point the finger of blame at any one in Government, but who did say that all concerned had agreed on the initial invasion plans.

/S/ S. J. Grogan

cc: ✓ AWD
Bissell

STANLEY J. GROGAN
Assistant to the Director